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1THE SELF-PROCLAIMED STATEHOOD OF THE ISLAMIC 
STATE BETWEEN 2014 AND 2017 AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Marco Longobardo* 
Abstract 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is considered one of the most serious threats to the 
entire world. In order to provide a lawful response against this threat, it is necessary to 
verify whether the Islamic State is actually a State. The concept of State is still at the 
centre of the contemporary international legal order, but there is not a general consensus 
about the elements that constitute a State under international law, and the conditions 
pursuant to which international personality is conferred to an entity claiming statehood. 
Accordingly, it can be useful to examine both the factual bases of the Islamic State and 
its legal entitlement to aspire to become an independent State under international law. 
From this enquiry, at the moment the Islamic State appears not to be a State in light of 
international law, but rather a group of insurgents with a territorial basis. 
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2LA AUTOPROCLAMADA ESTATALIDAD DEL ESTADO 
ISLÁMICO ENTRE 2014 Y 2017 Y EL DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL
Resumen
El Estado Islámico de Irak y Siria es considerado una de las amenazas más serias para el 
mundo entero. Para luchar contra esta amenaza, es necesario verificar si el Estado 
Islámico es en realidad un Estado a la luz del derecho internacional. El concepto de 
estado se encuentra en el centro del orden jurídico internacional contemporáneo, pero 
no hay un consenso general acerca de los elementos que constituyen un Estado, y acerca 
de las condiciones necesarias para considerar estado una entidad que reclame esta 
cualifica. En consecuencia, puede ser útil examinar los fundamentos del Estado islámico 
y su derecho a aspirar a convertirse en un Estado independiente en el derecho 
internacional. El Estado islámico no parece ser un Estado a la luz del derecho 
internacional, sino más bien un grupo de insurgentes con una base territorial.
Palabras clave: Estado Islámico; reconocimiento; autodeterminación; estatalidad; 
insurgentes; Siria; Irak
3I. INTRODUCTION
I’ve seen the future, baby: it is murder.1
From 2013, the International Community has been struck by the violent actions of the 
so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also ISIL, Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant, and Daesh). Mass human rights violations are committed daily in the north-
eastern part of Syria and in a huge portion of Iraqi territory. ISIS is at hearth a group of 
extremist jihadist rebels that gained control of a wide area. ISIS is also something more, 
though; it is a self-proclaimed State and a novelty in the most recent jihadist scenario as 
groups such as Al-Qaeda have never aimed to create a State before. Luckily, ISIS 
appears to be about to be defeated; however, this phenomenon still deserves scholarly 
attention because of the challenges it poses to international law.
The present essay studies ISIS in order to verify whether ISIS ever become a State 
according to international law. First, the inquiry will start with a brief overview of ISIS 
history. Then, it will describe the different theories about statehood and will apply the 
relevant criteria to the Islamic State. The essay will study, therefore, the capacity of 
ISIS to govern a defined territory and a permanent population, the relevance of the 
principle of self-determination, and the consequences on the statehood issue of their 
despotic regime, characterized by mass atrocities and human rights abuses.
This author considers the legal qualification of ISIS to be pivotal for the discourse 
regarding several international law issues arising from the armed conflict against ISIS in 
which a number of States are or have been involved. For instance, this is the case of jus 
ad bellum justifications pertaining to the fight against ISIS: even if they are beyond the 
1
 COHEN, L., «The Future», The Future, (1992).
4purview of this paper,2 suffice it to say that the qualification of ISIS as a State might 
influence the debate regarding the resort to armed force against ISIS. In the words of 
Christian Henderson, ‘there are other issues that have not been addressed … Firstly, 
given the way in which IS has proclaimed statehood, has significant capabilities and 
effective control over territory, to what extent, if any, might the jus ad bellum apply to 
its actions?’3 Just to mention one major issue, it is well known that the International 
Community accepts actions in self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter 
when a State faces an armed attack from another State. Conversely, the legality of an 
action in self-defence against non-state actors’ attacks is more debated, especially since 
the International Court of Justice seems to have ruled out this possibility, at least when 
2
 The scientific literature on jus ad bellum issues in the fight against ISIS is growing constantly. See, 
among others, ARIMATSU, L., SCHMITT, M. N., «Attacking the ‘Islamic State’ and the Khorasan Group: 
Surveying the International Law Landscape», Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Bulletin, 53, 
(2014), pp. 1-29; PICONE, P., «Unilateralismo e guerra contro l’ISIS», Rivista di diritto internazionale, 
98, (2015), pp. 5-27; GRADONI, L., «Gli obblighi erga omnes, l’idioma dell’egemone e la ricerca del 
diritto. Ancora sull’intervento contro l’ISIS e oltre», Quaderni di SIDIBlog, 1, (2014), pp. 271-290; 
HENDERSON, C., «The Use of Force and Islamic State», Journal on the Use of Force and International 
Law, 1, (2014), pp. 209-222; MOSCIATTI GÓMEZ G., «Los argumentos estadounidenses para justificar el 
uso de la fuerza contra el Estado Islámico», Revista Tribuna Internacional, 4, 2015, pp. 109-128; STERIO, 
M., «The Applicability of the Humanitarian Intervention Exception to the Middle Eastern Refugee Crisis: 
Why the International Community Should Intervene against ISIS», Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 
38, (2015), pp. 325–357; LATTY, F., «Le brouillage des repères du jus contra bellum. A propos de l’usage 
de la force par la France contre Daesch», Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 120, (2016), pp. 
11-39; CHRISTAKIS, T., (ed), «Symposium on the Fight against ISIL and International Law», Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 29, (2016), pp. 737-852; POZO SERRANO, P., «El uso de la fuerza contra el 
Estado Islámico en Irak y Siria: problemas de fundamentación jurídica», Anuario Español de Derecho 
Internacional, 32, (2016), pp. 141-188.
3
 HENDERSON, C., «The Use of Force», cit., p. 221. See also NIGRO, R., «La risoluzione del Consiglio di 
sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite n. 2249 (2015) e la legittimità dell’uso della forza contro l’ISIS in base al 
diritto internazionale», Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 10, (2016), pp. 137-156, pp. 144-145.
5the armed groups are located in a territory that is under occupation.4 Accordingly, 
qualifying ISIS as a State would simplify the recourse to self-defence as a justification 
for the airstrikes against its strongholds.
Similarly, the question of ISIS’s statehood is relevant in order to verify which rules 
of international humanitarian law are applicable. At the risk of simplifying a more 
complex issue that cannot be examined here properly, the scenario can be summarized 
as follows: if one considers ISIS to be a State, rules regarding international armed 
conflicts should be applied; if one considers ISIS to be a non-state actor and that its 
actions are not supported by the principle of self-determination of peoples, then rules on 
non-international armed conflicts should be applied.5 
In order to answer to questions like these, a rigorous analysis of ISIS’s statehood 
claim is important. Clearly, these days ISIS embodies everything that is heinous and 
that offends the sense of justice of billions of people around the world. However, 
statehood is not a kind of reward that the International Community bestows upon 
worthy entities. Rather, it is a status that significantly depends on criteria that should be 
assessed from a legal perspective. The need for scientific attention on this question is 
4
 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion), [2004] ICJ Rep., p. 136, para. 139. For some critical remarks on this paragraph, see MURPHY, 
S. D., «Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?», American 
Journal of International Law, 99, 2005, pp. 62-76; TAMS, C. J., «Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: 
The Law of Self-Defence in the Wall Case», European Journal of International Law, 16, 2005, pp. 963-
978. On the issue of self-defence against non-state actors, from a broader perspective, see MILANO, E., «Il 
ricorso all'uso della forza nei confronti degli attori non statali», in A. LANCIOTTI, A. TANZI, (ed.), Uso 
della forza e legittima difesa nel diritto internazionale contemporaneo, Napoli, Jovene, 2012, pp. 105-
137.
5
 On the issue of the jus in bello applicable in the fight against ISIS, see LÓPEZ-JACOISTE DÍAZ M.E., «El 
conflicto armado en Siria a la luz del derecho internacional», Anuario de Derecho Publico, 1, 2014, pp. 
515-542; KOUTROULIS, V., «The Fight Against the Islamic State and Jus in Bello», Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 29, 2016, pp. 827-852; DINSTEIN Y., «The Syrian Armed Conflict and its Singular 
Characteristics», The Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 46, 2016, pp. 261-279.
6proved by the growing academic literature on ISIS’s statehood, especially thanks to 
scholars from civil law systems.6 Although so far no scholar has supported the idea that 
ISIS has ever been a State, there are different opinions regarding ISIS’s fulfillment of 
some statehood criteria, especially regarding the key element of effective capacity to 
govern a territory. Accordingly, this paper aims to analyze from a rigorous legal 
perspective whether ISIS is or has ever been a State, in the hope that this analysis would 
contribute to clarify many issues pertaining to the fight against ISIS.
II. ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA: WHERE ARE YOU FROM?
Of course you can’t say those of us who removed Saddam 
in 2003 bear no responsibility for the situation in 2015.7
A study regarding the statehood of an entity has to take into account the entity’s history; 
in fact, statehood is strictly connected to human events and it is not possible to examine 
6
 See CHAUMETTE, A.-L., «DAESH: un “État” Islamique?», Annuaire francais de droit international, 60, 
(2014), pp. 71-89;  TOMUSCHAT, C., «The Status of the “Islamic State” under International Law», Die 
Friedens-Warte, 90, (2015), pp. 223-244; SINKONDO, M., «Daech est-il un état? Retour critique sur la 
théorie néopositiviste des éléments constitutifs de l’Etat à l’épreuve de l’actualité internationale», Revue 
de droit international et de droit comparé, 93, (2016), pp. 240-258; VAN ENGELAND, A., «Statehood, 
Proto States and International Law: New Challenges, Looking at the Case of ISIS» in CRAWFORD, J. ET 
AL (eds.), The International Legal Order: Current Needs and Possible Responses Essays in Honour of 
Djamchid Momtaz, Leiden, Brill, 2017, pp. 75-86.
7
 Tony Blair spoke these words, as reported by WHAT, N., «Tony Blair Makes Qualified Apology for Iraq 
War ahead of Chilcot Report», The Guardian, 25 October 2015, available at www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/oct/25/tony-blair-sorry-iraq-war-mistakes-admits-conflict-role-in-rise-of-isis.
7it while ignoring the origins of the entity claiming statehood. This is true also in relation 
to ISIS, a relatively new-born entity, which has faced several transformations.8
In the days in which this paper is finalized, ISIS seems to be close to its end. Its 
history began in 1999, when a group of Islamic fighters, principally composed of Sunni 
militias and called Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, appeared in Iraq. After the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, the group, renamed in to 2004 al-Qaeda in Iraq, took active part in the 
insurgency against the occupying coalition and started a policy of cooperation with 
other militias, especially with former members of the Baath party. In 2006, al-Qaeda in 
Iraq joined other Sunni Iraqi armed groups and formed the Mujahideen Shura Council, 
which gave birth shortly afterwards to the Islamic State of Iraq. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
was the leader of this group and led it against the counterinsurgency actions of the Iraqi 
government, which failed to defeat the rebels, especially after the U.S. abandoned Iraq 
in 2010.
Al-Baghdadi also led the rebels into the Syrian Civil War, taking advantage from 
the fragile control that Bashar al-Assad maintained over the Syrian territory, and joining 
its forces with the al-Nusra front, a ferocious coalitions of Syrian anti-Assad groups. 
Having involved his militias in the Syrian carnage and merged with the al-Nusra front, 
al-Baghdadi coined the new name of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in April 2013. Soon 
after, on 29 June 2014, the group proclaimed the creation of a worldwide caliphate and 
was renamed Islamic State. Al-Baghdadi obtained the role of caliph, merging religious 
and political authority.9
8
 On the origin and development of ISIS, see, among others, CHULOV, M., «Isis: The Inside Story», The 
Guardian, 11 December 2014, available at www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-
story; WOOD, G., «What ISIS Really Wants», The Atlantic, March 2015, available at 
www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/; MOLINARI, M., Il 
califfato del terrore: perché lo Stato islamico minaccia l’Occidente, Milano, Rizzoli, 2015.  
9
 In May 2015, al-Baghdadi was wounded in an airstrike (CHULOV, M., SHAHEEN, K., «Isis Leader Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi ‘Seriously Wounded in Air Strike’», The Guardian, 21 April 2015, available at 
8In order to consolidate its control over the territory and the population of the 
northern Iraq and Syria, ISIS government is based on terror and paramilitary actions, 
which are considered worldwide gross violations of human rights.10 Religious 
minorities, including both Shiites and Christian sects such as the Yazidis, have been so 
far the most vexed groups. It is reported that ISIS policy towards them is different; non-
Sunni Muslims can have their lives spared if they become Sunni, whilst people of other 
religions are brutally killed and their women are sold as forced wives.
In a number of occasion, the UN Security Council has designated ISIS as a terrorist 
organization,11 and called upon Members States to ‘to take all necessary measures, in 
compliance with international law […] to redouble and coordinate their efforts to 
prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL’.12 In this regard, one 
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/21/isis-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-wounded-air-strike). 
Subsequently, on 16 June 2017, Russia claimed that he might have been killed in an airstrike launched on 
28 May 2017 (DEWAN A., BOYKOFF P., «Russia says it may have killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi», CNN, 17 June 2017, available at edition.cnn.com/2017/06/16/middleeast/al-baghdadi-isis-
killed-russia-airstrike/index.html.). His death has not been confirmed yet.
10
 For some details on ISIS gross human rights violations, see the reports of the UN Human Rights 
Council: Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 
Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/CRP.3 (2014); Report of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Iraq in Light of 
the Abuses Committed by the So-Called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Associated Groups, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/28/18 (2015); Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Iraq in the Light of Abuses Committed by the So-Called Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant and Associated Groups, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/18 (2016).  
11
 See e.g. SC Res 2170 (2014), UN Doc. S/RES/2170 (2014); SC Res 2178 (2014), UN Doc. 
S/RES/2178 (2014); SC Res 2199 (2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2199 (2015).
12
 SC Res 2249 (2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2249 (2915). For a discussion, see AKANDE, D., MILANOVIC, M., 
«The Constructive Ambiguity of the Security Council’s ISIS Resolution», EJIL: Talk!, 21 November 
2015, available at www.ejiltalk.org/the-constructive-ambiguity-of-the-security-councils-isis-resolution/; 
MARTIN, J. C., «Les frappes de la France contre l’EIIL en Syrie, à la lumière de la résolution 2249 (2015) 
9has to note that the Iraqi government required help in order to regain control over its 
territory controlled by ISIS, and a coalition of States, led by the US, began an aerial 
campaign against ISIS bases in Iraq; by contrast, in Syria, for many months, al-Assad 
did not officially request any foreign intervention, but nevertheless, some States decided 
to intervene after having merely informed the Syrian government, principally claiming a 
right of self-defence and to intervene since Syria was unwillingly or unable to face such 
a global menace. At the end of September 2015, however, al-Assad requested and 
obtained Russian military support against ISIS.13 The efforts of all the actors involved 
in the fight against ISIS have constantly reduced the territory under the group’s control, 
and in June 2017 the Kurd militias were able to enter the ISIS capital Raqqa.14
ISIS’s plan to establish a new State by conquering territories and to persuade 
people all around the world to join its ferocious war has been between 2014 and 2017 
one of the most serious concerns of the Western World.15 Two main factors have 
determined this situation: on the one hand, ISIS is incredibly able to give media 
attention to its atrocities and system of administration in order to instill terror in their 
enemies while at the same time fascinating potential fighters from all over the world, 
du Conseil de sécurité», Questions of International Law, Zoom Out 24, (2016), pp. 3-14; HILPOLD, P., 
«The Evolving Right of Counter-Terrorism: An Analysis of SC Resolution 2249 (2015) in View of Some 
Basic Contributions in International Law Literature», ibidem, pp. 15-34; MILANO, E., «Oltre l’esegesi 
della risoluzione 2249», SIDIBlog, 2 March 2016, available at www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/?p=1722.
13
 See CHAPPELL, B., «Russia Begins Airstrikes In Syria After Assad's Request», NPR, 30 September 
2015, available at www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/09/30/444679327/russia-begins-conducting-
airstrikes-in-syria-at-assads-request.
14
 See GEORGY M., «Spirits high among Kurds in Syria as coalition battles for Raqqa», Reuter, 15 June 
2017, available at www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-raqqa-mood-idUSKBN1962PC.
15
 See the statement made by the French President Hollande at the 7272 meeting of the Security Council, 
UN Doc. S/PV.7272 (2014), p. 6.
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which are flowing to Syria and Iraq to fight in the ISIS army;16 on the other hand, many 
radical Islamic movements in other countries consider ISIS to be a source of inspiration, 
so that today the name ISIS is also commonly applied, for instance, to the Libyan anti-
government groups and Boko Haram in Nigeria.17 Even if the creation of a united 
Islamic State from North Africa to Ancient Persia is proclaimed as one of the ultimate 
goals of all these terrorist groups, the present essay will deal only with the statehood of 
ISIS in Syria and Iraq.
III. THE QUESTION OF ISIS’S STATEHOOD
‘Self-determination” should be handled with care.18
1. A Still Open Question: of the Concept of ‘State’ in International Law
States enjoy international legal personality and are the primary subjects of international 
law. Despite the fact that traditionally international law is considered the law of States 
and that almost all the international law handbooks and treatises begin with a chapter 
16
 See FARWELL, J. P., «The Media Strategy of ISIS», Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 56, (2014) 
pp. 49–55; KLAUSEN, J., «Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in 
Syria and Iraq», Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 38, (2015), pp. 1–22.
17
 See ORTIZ, E., «Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau Pledges Allegiance to ISIS in New Audio», 
NBC News, 7 March 2015, available at www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/boko-haram-leader-
pledges-allegiance-isis-new-audio-n319256; RYAN, Y., «Isis in Libya: Muammar Gaddafi's soldiers are 
back in the country and fighting under the black flag of the Islamic State», The Independent, 16 March 
2015, available at www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-in-libya-muammar-gaddafis-
soldiers-are-back-in-the-country-and-fighting-under-the-black-flag-of-the-islamic-state-10111964.html. 
18
 H.F.E. Whitlam, Australian representative to the Human Rights Commission during the drafting of the 
Human Rights Covenants, 264th meeting, 1952, quoted in SUMMERS, J., Peoples and International Law, 
Leiden | Boston, Brill | Nijhoff, 2007, p. ix.
11
about statehood, the concept of State in international law is controversial among 
scholars even today. In the absence of a well-established consensus about what is a 
State, traditionally, Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States is considered a useful guide because it sets forth four statehood criteria: 
a permanent population, a defined territory, government and capacity to enter into 
relations with the other States. 19 However, this convention neither creates nor codifies 
the statehood requirements, as  international personality of States is attributed by 
general international law, not by a regional treaty such as the Montevideo Convention.20 
The debate about what a State is and how it gains international personality is far more 
complex, and can be simplified as follow.
According to the first and oldest theory, the constitutive theory, only entities which 
are recognized as States by the other States have international personality.21 The basic 
assumption is that States are the primary subjects of international law, and, 
consequently, that only they may decide whether an entity is a State and bestow on it 
the powers and duties of a State. This theory is not very popular today, because it 
relativizes the concept of State so that entity ‘A’ could be simultaneously recognized as 
a State by State ‘B’ but not by State ‘C’; it could be recognized today by State ‘D’ and 
in twenty years by State ‘E’.22 On the contrary, statehood is a status that objectively 
19
 (1936) 165 LNTS 20. See e.g. HIGGINS, R., Problem and Process: International Law and How We Use 
It, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 39.
20
 See CRAVEN, M., «Statehood, Self-Determination, and Recognition», in M. D. EVANS, (ed.), 
International Law, 4th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 201, p. 217.  
21
 See e.g. OPPENHEIM, L., International Law, London, Longmans, London, 1905, p. 110; KELSEN, H., 
«Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observation», American Journal of International Law, 
35, (1941), pp. 605–617.
22
 According to KELSEN, H., op. cit., p. 609: «a State exists legally only in its relations to other States. 
There is no such thing as absolute existence».
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attributes powers and duties to all the members of the International Community at the 
same time.23
According to a second opinion, developed principally by civil law scholars in the 
twentieth century, the State is a matter of fact that emerges on the basis of political and 
historical events; international law does not regulate the creation of the States, but rather 
it directly confers international personality to entities characterized by a government 
able to rule effectively and independently over a permanent population settled in a 
defined territory.24 The effective and independent government is the prevalent element; 
a government is effective when the entity is able to legislate and enforce its laws in a 
territory and in relation to certain individuals,25 whilst the independence is related to the 
absence of legal constraints on the government, save those arising from international 
law.26 The territory and the population are therefore the spatial and personal scope in 
23
 See TREVES, T., Diritto internazionale: problemi fondamentali, Milano, Giuffrè, 2005, pp. 58–59.
24
 See Conference on Yugoslavia, «Arbitration Commission, Opinions on Questions Arising from the 
Dissolution of Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission), Opinion n. 1», International Legal Materials, 31, 
(1992), p. 1494, p. 1485. See also, among others, ARANGIO-RUIZ, G., «L’Etat dans le sens du Droit des 
Gens et la Notion du Droit international», Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 26, (1976), 
pp. 3-63 and pp. 265-406; ABI-SAAB, G., «Cours général de droit international public», RCADI, 207, 
(1987/VII), p. 15, pp. 68–69; QUADRI, R., «Stato (diritto internazionale)», in QUADRI, R., Scritti 
Giuridici, Milano, Giuffrè, 1988, pp. 189–238; PELLET, A., «Le droit international à l’aube du XXIème 
siècle», 1 Cours Euro-méditerranéens Bancaja de Droit International (1997/I), p. 19, pp. 55–56; 
TANCREDI, A., «Lo Stato nel diritto internazionale tra effettività e legalità/legittimità», Ars Interpretandi, 
16, 2011, pp. 131-172; COMBACAU, J., SUR, S., Droit international public, 10th edn., Paris, LGDJ, 2012, 
p. 267.
25
 See DUPUY, P.-M., «L’unité de l’ordre juridique international. Cours général de droit international 
public», RCADI, 297, (2002), p. 9, pp. 95–96; SHAW, M. N., International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, pp. 198–199.
26
 See Régime Douanier Entre l’Allemagne et l’Autriche (Protocole du 19 Mars 1931), Avis Consultatif 
du 5 Septembre 1931, PCIJ Rep Series A No 41, pp. 57–58 (Judge Anzilotti, individual opinion).
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which the government normally exercises its powers and fulfills its duties.27 This 
theory, which can be called the ‘factual theory’, is built on the principle of 
effectiveness, which is considered the primary pillar of statehood. As a result, the 
recognition of other States does not have constitutive effects on statehood, but it is 
merely declaratory of pre-existing statehood.28 As a further consequence, since a State 
is an historical fact with legal consequences, no authority can decide whether an entity 
is a State or not, not even the United Nations. In recent times, however, this theory 
evolved so that modern supporters concede that international law guides the factual 
emergency of a State, encouraging or discouraging the stabilization of the effective 
powers on the basis of respect for fundamental international rules.29 
More recently, other scholars have developed a third view, the so-called ‘legalistic 
theory’. This theory, without repudiating the factual premises, considers that an entity 
which effectively and independently exercises sovereign powers over a population and a 
territory may not enjoy international personality if it does not respect some fundamental 
rules of international law (e.g. the ban on the use of force and the principle of self-
determination).30 According to this opinion, the International Community would be 
27
 See QUADRI, R., La sudditanza nel diritto internazionale, Padova, Cedam, 1936, p. 28; ARANGIO-RUIZ, 
G., op. cit., pp. 50–63. 
28
 See CHEN, T., The International Law of Recognition, With Special Reference to Practice in Great 
Britain and the United States, New York, Praeger, 1951, p. 14; BRIERLY, J. L., The Law of Nations: An 
Introduction to the International Law of Peace, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 139. 
29
 See TANCREDI, A., «A Normative ‘Due Process’ in the Creation of States through Secession», in M. G. 
KOHEN (ed.), Secession: International Law Perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
p. 171, pp. 205–206, and «Neither Authorized nor Prohibited? Secession and International Law after 
Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia», Italian Yearbook of International Law, 28, (2008), p. 37, p. 54. 
30
 See e.g. CRAWFORD, J., The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979 
and 2006; DUGARD, J., Recognition and the United Nations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1987; KOHEN, M. G., «Création d’Etats en droit international contemporain», Cours euro-méditerranéens 
Bancaja de droit international, 6, (2002), pp. 546–635; RAIČ, D., Statehood and the Law of Self-
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under a duty not to recognize the entity as a State and not to admit it into international 
organizations; the said entity would be, therefore, classified as a de facto regime.31 Even 
for this opinion’s supporters, effectiveness is essential for a State, but it is not sufficient; 
the territorial entity claiming statehood should also demonstrate respect for the basic 
rules of the International Community.32
In reality, the debate is far more complex and each of the abovementioned theories 
can be divided into a number of sub-theories that are, at the same time, interrelated, so 
that today the divide between factual and legalistic theories is not so wide, and State 
recognition is considered a relevant legal element in both.33 Accordingly, albeit this 
author generally considers a modern approach to the factual theory more in line with the 
contemporary structure of international relations, the present essay will analyze ISIS 
statehood both in light of the factual and legalistic views.34
      
2. Applying the Statehood Criteria to ISIS
a. The International Personality of ISIS According to the Factual Theory
Determination, Leiden | Boston, Nijhoff, 2002; ORAKHELASHVILI, A., «Statehood, Recognition and the 
United Nations System: A Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Kosovo», Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, 12, (2008), pp. 1–44.
31
 See FROWEIN, J. A., «De Facto Regime», Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
online, 2013.
32
 See CRAWFORD, J., op. cit., p. 98. 
33
 For a critical overview of the different theories and methodological approaches, see D’ASPREMONT, J., 
«The International Law of Statehood: Craftsmanship for the Elucidation and Regulation of Births and 
Deaths in the International Society», Connecticut Journal of International Law, 29, (2014), pp. 201-224. 
34
 The same approach has been employed by this author in the analysis of Palestinian statehood. See 
LONGOBARDO, M., «Lo Stato di Palestina: emersione fattuale e autodeterminazione dei popoli prima e 
dopo il riconoscimento dello status di Stato non membro delle Nazioni Unite», in M. DISTEFANO (ed), Il 
principio di autodeterminazione dei popoli alla prova del nuovo millennio, Padova, Cedam, 2014, pp. 9-
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In order to determine whether ISIS has ever been a State, first one has to verify whether 
ISIS has ever governed a defined territory and a permanent population independently 
and effectively. Due to the war in the region, collecting information about the events is 
no simple task given that the main source of data is ISIS itself, which clearly mixes 
factual information with propaganda. Consequently, it is necessary not to overestimate 
these data, which are held as true only for academic purposes and should be subject to 
confirmation through research on the field.
One has to acknowledge that ISIS developed a sophisticated, albeit heinous, form 
of governmental organization. According to the UN, ‘ISIS functions under responsible 
command and has a hierarchical structure, including a policy level.’35 The ultimate 
authority is al-Baghdadi, who governs the controlled territory through a network of 
local officials, both military and civil.36 ISIS gained control over people and territory 
through the use of the force, enforcing its power with violence. The territorial scope of 
its administration is broad. ISIS gained military control over the north-eastern part of 
Syria and north-western Iraq, including the important cities of Raqqa, Mosul, Falluja37 
and, for some months, Palmyr. This area is not particularly cohesive and many ISIS-
conquered cities are isolated from the rest of the controlled territory. Muslims of 
different groups, Christians, and other minorities inhabit this territory. It is one of the 
Earth’s most ancient populated areas, as testified by the many archaeological sites 
brutally destroyed by ISIS fighters.38  
35
 UN Doc A/HRC/27/CRP.3, cit., para. 13.
36
 Ibidem.
37
 For a map, see US Department of Defense, Iraq and Syria: ISIL Reduced Operating Area as of April 
2015, available at www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604444.
38
 See e.g. CULLINANE, S., ALKHSHALI, H., TAWFEEQ, M., «Tracking a Trail of Historical Obliteration: 
ISIS Trumpets Destruction of Nimrud», CNN, 14 April 2015, available at 
edition.cnn.com/2015/03/09/world/iraq-isis-heritage/.
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ISIS administration incorporates all the traditional branches of the government. 
ISIS has passed new legislation in the conquered cities, such as the ‘Contract of the 
City’ of Nineveh, which is an abhorrent list of treatments constituting punishment for 
several alleged criminal offences.39 ISIS has organized a perverted form of judicial 
system in order to ensure the implementation of the new legislation;40 it is reported that 
courts located in Iraq, Syria, and even Lebanon41 have ordered many terrible 
executions.42 The governance structure is very sophisticated in certain regions that have 
been under ISIS control longer: e.g., in the Syrian city of Raqqa, ISIS has provided for 
Islamic and elementary education, water and electricity, humanitarian aid and mediation 
between different tribes.43 In order to accomplish the building of a proper civil 
administration, ISIS asked foreign doctors, engineers, and administrators to come to the 
controlled area in order to contribute to the construction of the Islamic State.44 ISIS has 
also released a document in order to inform the world how well it governs the city of 
Aleppo, boastfully described as a paradise on Earth.45 
39
 For the Arabic test and some remarks, see MOORE, J., «Iraq Isis Crisis: Medieval Sharia Law Imposed 
on Millions in Nineveh Province», International Business Times, 12 June 2014, available at 
www.ibtimes.co.uk/iraq-isis-crisis-medieval-sharia-law-imposed-millions-nineveh-province-1452401. 
40
 See CARIS, C. C., REYNOLDS, S., ISIS Governance in Syria. Middle East Security Report n. 22 (July 
2014), pp. 18–19.
41
 See e.g. KULLAB, S., SEMAAN, E., «ISIS running Shariah court in Arsal in bid to win hearts and 
minds», The Dayly Star Lebanon, 7 February 2015, available at www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-
News/2015/Feb-07/286716-isis-running-shariah-court-in-arsal-in-bid-to-win-hearts-and-minds.ashx.
42See UN Doc A/HRC/28/18, cit., para. 49.
43
 See UN Doc A/HRC/27/CRP.3, cit., para. 16; Caris, C. C., and REYNOLDS, S., op. cit., pp. 14–23.
44
 See ADAMCZYK, E., «ISIS Leader to World’s Muslims: Build Islamic State», UPI, 1 July 2014, 
available at www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2014/07/01/ISIS-leader-to-worlds-Muslims-Build-
Islamic-State/8971404235322/.
45
 See KERR, S., SOLOMON, E., «“State of Aleppo” Brochure Reveals Isis Visions for Islamic State», 
Financial Times, 30 June 2014, available at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e882b36-005e-11e4-a3f2-
00144feab7de.html.
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The crucial question is whether this governance system can be considered 
sufficiently independent and effective to fulfill the statehood criterion.46 One has to 
acknowledge that ISIS is not a puppet government, but rather, shows a defiant scale of 
independence. Its administration is not bound by the will of another State by virtue of a 
treaty or any other legal instrument, nor is its action de facto directed or controlled by 
another State. 
However, ISIS administration appears to lack effectiveness. Although the will of 
ISIS officials is normally enforced, the governmental powers’ scope of application 
ratione personarum and ratione loci is not sufficiently stable to assess the effectiveness 
of the whole government.47 Due to continuing fights with the Iraqi, Syrian, and Kurdish 
armies and the international coalition’s airstrikes, ISIS is unable to govern a portion of 
territory in a stable way. Rather, its powers are often just sporadic and the government 
apparatus shifts from area to area following the turns of the war.48 
46
 For the position according to which ISIS exercises governmental authority on the territory it controls, 
see SHANY, Y., COHEN, A., «ISIS: Is the Islamic State Really a State?», 14 September 2014, available at 
www.en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/isis-is-the-islamic-state-really-a-state/; GRANT, T. D., «Is the Islamic 
State Actually a State? No, but Letting It Say So Is Dangerous», 8 June 2015, available at 
www.newrepublic.com/article/121988/far-reaching-implications-islamic-stateclaiming-statehood. 
47
 See ZICCARDI CAPALDO, G., «Le nuove situazioni territoriali illegittime. L’intervento ‘tutelare di 
sicurezza immediata’ nei territori sotto il controllo dell’ISIL: un tertium genus di intervento armato a 
titolo collettivo?», November 2014, p. 8, available at www.sidi-isil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/G.-
ZICCARDI-CAPALDO-per-forum-SIDI.pdf.
48
 ISIS is losing control of several areas while conquering others. See MACKAY, M., «U.S.: ISIS Loses 
Quarter of Territory in Iraq: 3 Things You Need to Know», CNN, 16 April 2015, available at 
edition.cnn.com/2015/04/15/middleeast/isis-loses-territory-iraq/; CHULOV, M., HAWRAMY, F., 
«Peshmerga Forces Enter Sinjar in Fight against Isis», The Guardian, 11 November 2015, available at 
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/13/peshmerga-forces-sinjar-isis-oust-gunfire-kurdish; EVANS, D., 
«Islamic State Driven Out of Syria’s Ancient Palmyra City», Reuters, 28 March 2016, available at 
uk.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-palmyra-idUKKCN0WT04R.
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Stability is not a different criterion in and of itself, but rather, it is part of 
effectiveness. A governmental act, e.g. a law, cannot be effectively implemented if there 
is no continuity in the administration of a territory since may not be a court to enforce it 
when the need arises.49 In this respect, the obstacle to ISIS statehood is not the fact that 
its territory is not precisely defined, a circumstance which does not affect the 
international personality of already established States,50 but rather the fact that it is 
totally unclear what territory is claimed, since ISIS control changes greatly daily and 
there is no historical title that can be used as a reference. Consequently, for the time 
being, ISIS lacks effective government, and therefore, statehood.51
Not only is a defined territory totally absent with the aforementioned repercussions 
on the statehood of ISIS, but it is also impossible to circumscribe a permanent 
population subject to ISIS government, since its control over entire human communities 
shifts every months. 
In light of these factual elements, ISIS appears to be an insurrectional group. 
Insurgents are international subjects that exercise de facto powers over a territory but 
are provisional in character since they are doomed to be quelled and disappear if their 
outcome is not the formation of a new State.52 This is the ISIS scenario: its 
administration is provisional in the sense that it is not stable, and, therefore, ISIS cannot 
be considered a State. Due to its relative scarcity of men, ISIS is like an oil spill in the 
sea: it reaches many far areas, but in doing so it is losing consistence, i.e. control over 
certain zones, since its army cannot control at the same time all the areas where the 
49
 See QUADRI, R., Diritto internazionale pubblico, 4th ed., Napoli, Liguori, 1968, p. 444; CRAWFORD, J., 
op. cit., p. 60.
50
 See Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v Polish State, 5 International Law Reports (1929) p. 11, 
pp. 14–15; North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany v Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, para. 46.
51
 See RAIČ, D., op. cit., pp. 61–62. 
52
 See CASSESE, A., International Law, 2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005,  p. 71 and p. 
130.
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hostilities are conducted; therefore, there are many gaps in the structure of ISIS 
territory, and many others are created every time ISIS is forced to loosen its ranks in 
order to move troops to conquer other positions. By contrast, if ISIS consolidate its 
power over a delimited area and its inhabitants, then it could claim to be a State 
according to the factual theory. At the moment, on the basis of the ineffectiveness of the 
territorial control ISIS exercises, statehood is a goal, not a reality.53 Fortunately, in light 
of the most recent developments, it is extremely unlikely that ISIS will fulfill this goal 
although in the past this risk seemed concrete.
b. ISIS Statehood in Light of the Principle of Self-Determination of Peoples
Beside the factual theory, ISIS cannot be considered a State from a legalistic view as 
well.
The core concept of the legalistic theory is that the factual criteria are insufficient to 
determine statehood by themselves, but that the territorial entity claiming to be a State 
should be entitled to statehood by virtue of the principle of self-determination of 
peoples, and must respect the most important rules of international law, for instance 
those regarding the ban on the use of force and gross human rights violations.54
In general terms, applying one of the traditional categories about State modification 
(dismemberments, merger, incorporation, secession, devolution) to the current situation 
in Iraq and Syria caused by ISIS insurgency is difficult. On the one hand, one could 
consider that ISIS is performing two different secessions respectively from Iraq and 
Syria, with the aim to unify the resulting territorial entity into a new integrated State; on 
the other, it is likely that ISIS wants to create a State on the entire territory of Iraq and 
Syria, and, therefore, its actions could be qualified as a revolution, more precisely as an 
53
 See PICONE, P., «Unilateralismo», cit., p. 25; WATKIN, K., «Targeting “Islamic State” Oil Facilities», 
International Law Studies, 90, (2014), p. 499, p. 500.
54
 See the authors cited supra note 30.
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attempt to change at the same time two regimes (in Iraq and Syria) and to merge the 
resulting entities.55 But this phenomenon is far more complex. If one considers Iraq as 
the historical ISIS basis, it is possible to argue that Syria is facing an armed attack from 
a non-state actor located in Iraq that also enjoys the support of part of the Syrian 
population. 
However, one should consider whether ISIS is acting pursuant to the principle of 
self-determination, the legal basis of every statehood claim.
The principle of self-determination is embodied in the UN Charter, in the 1966 
Covenants, and in general international law, and it was born in the decolonizing era.56 
On the basis of this principle, the UN General Assembly ‘Declaration on Friendly 
Relations among States’ affirmed that ‘the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples under 
colonial and alien domination recognized as being entitled to the right to self-
determination to restore to themselves that right by any means at their disposal.’57 In 
55
 On the use of the term ‘revolution’ in the international law discourse, see TAYLOR, O., «Reclaiming 
Revolution», Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 22, (2011), pp. 259–292.
56
 See UN Charter, Articles 1(2) and 55; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, common Article 1. See generally 
KOSKENNIEMI, M., «National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice»,  
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 43, (1994), pp. 241-269; CASSESE, A., Self-Determination 
of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995; CHRISTAKIS, T., Le 
droit à l’autodétermination en dehors des situations de décolonisation, Paris, La documentation 
française; CASTELLINO, J., International Law and Self-determination, Leiden | Boston, Nijhoff, 2000; 
FERRER LLORET, J., La aplicación del principio de autodeterminación de los pueblos: Sahara Occidental 
y Timor Oriental, Alicante, Universidad de Alicante, 2002; SUMMERS, J., op. cit.; OETER, S., «Self-
Determination», in B. SIMMA et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd edn, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 313–334; PALMISANO, G., «Il principio di autodeterminazione 
dei popoli», in Enciclopedia del Diritto, Annali V, Milano, Giuffrè, 2012, pp. 82-133; RUIZ MIGUEL, C., 
«El principio y derecho de autodeterminación y el pueblo del Sahara Occidental», Anuario Español de 
Derecho Internacional, 31, 2015, pp. 267-296. 
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 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (1970) paras 1-2.
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that context, some authors argued that national liberation movements may use force 
against the Colonial State in order to gain independence.58 A national liberation 
movement is a non-state actor that is representative of a people entitled to self-
determination and that exercises this right on behalf of the people.59 However, ISIS does 
not appear to be involved in a war of national liberation. First, ISIS is not a national 
liberation movement because there is no colonial system or alien domination in Syria 
and Iraq that bar a people from exercising its right to self-determination. Second, all the 
national liberation movements are representative of the people for whose self-
determination they fight:60 this representativeness is normally supported by the 
International Community, which, through the UN, acknowledges the representative 
character of these groups and considers them partial subjects of international law, as in 
the case of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.61 By contrast, ISIS is not 
representative of the Syrian and Iraqi population, and its struggle received no 
legitimization by the International Community.62 Actually, national liberation 
58
 See WILSON, H. A., International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 91–146; CASSESE, A., Self-Determination of Peoples, cit., pp. 197–
198; RUIZ COLOMÉ, M. A., Guerras civiles y guerras coloniales, Madrid, Eurolex, 1996, pp. 97-99.
59
 See generally LAZARUS, C., «Le Statut International des Mouvements de Libération Nationale à 
l’Organisation des Nations Unies», Annuaire Français de Droit International, 20, (1974), pp. 173–200;  
BARBERIS, J., «Nouvelles questions concernant la personnalité juridique international», 179 RCADI 
(1983/I), p. 145, pp. 239–268; CASSESE, A., International Law, cit., pp. 140–142.
60
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international, (2008), pp. 4–7, available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266047.
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movements are not common today since the decolonization process has been mostly 
accomplished in all the corner of the world. After the decolonizing era, self-
determination can be exercised only in cases of foreign occupation or apartheid; it has 
been suggested that these situations could justify revolts against the foreign occupant63 
or the racist government.64 However, Iraq and Syria are not occupied countries nor 
apartheid regimes, and, therefore, ISIS insurgency cannot be justified on the basis of the 
principle of self-determination with reference to this scenario.
According to some scholars, ethnic, religious or racial groups may claim a right to 
secession when persecuted by their own country, on the basis of the so-called remedial 
secession doctrine, which is based on a peculiar interpretation of a provision embodied 
in the UN General Assembly ‘Declaration on Friendly Relations among States’.65 Yet 
ISIS cannot claim to be fighting for a remedial secession. Even if the fighters could be 
considered potentially entitled to self-determination as members of a religious group 
(the Sunni) in theory, this is incorrect in concreto since the governments of Iraq and 
Syria are not massively violating the human rights of that specific group. In Syria, a 
violent civil war between Sunni rebels and Assad has resulted in the death of thousands 
must be an essential part of any inclusive political process» (UN Doc. S/PV.7242 (2014), p. 5) (emphasis 
added). See also Henderson, C., op. cit., p. 210.
63
 The inhabitants of an occupied territory do not have a duty of obedience towards the Occupying Power 
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Occupant», British Year Book of International Law, 27, (1950), pp. 235–266.     
64
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of people, but it did not originate from religious or ethnic hatred, but rather from the 
clash between political factions for the control of the Syrian State — a scenario far from 
legitimate struggles for gaining political self-determination.66 Even if, prior to the 
awareness of their affiliation with ISIS, some Western States recognized the anti-Assad 
rebels as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people,67 these acts should be 
considered merely political and no more relevant in the present scenario. Consequently,  
any reference to a right of self-determination in this situation is improper.68 In any case, 
the existence of an international customary rule about remedial secession is not 
supported by an uniform State practice,69 and it was not endorsed by the International 
Court of Justice.70
66
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War (2014), available at www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE115.
67
 See «Syria conflict: UK Recognises Opposition, Says William Hague», BBC News, 20 November 
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Accordingly, Iraqi and Syrian governments have the right to quell the rebellion by 
virtue of the principle of territorial integrity, while respecting the international 
humanitarian law norms about internal conflicts at the same time.71 ISIS fight cannot be 
considered a legitimate exercise of the right to self-determination.   
c. Other Legal Criteria Applied to ISIS
In recent decades, other statehood criteria have been suggested by scholars, as actual 
additional criteria or as elements which would give stability to the territorial entity and 
reinforce the effectiveness of its government. These additional criteria will be briefly 
analyzed here with regard to ISIS, even if they would not be sufficient to consider ISIS 
a State abstain the aforementioned factual and legal criteria.
First, some commentators have argued that, in the pursuit of independence, an 
entity claiming to be a State should respect some fundamental rules of international law, 
such as the ban on the use of force, the principle of self-determination, and the principle 
of uti possidetis juris. If the territorial entity gains effectiveness by violating these 
70
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norms, it would not enjoy international personality.72 Even supporters of a modern 
factual theory considers that the respect for the fundamental rules of international law 
constitutes a ‘normative due process’ in the creation of a State,73 and that in case of 
violations of these rules, the entity is not automatically prevented from gaining 
international personality, but other States are under a duty not to recognize its statehood 
and to consider void its acts,74 making it very difficult for the said entity to govern 
effectively and independently.75 In addition, some authors argued that negotiations 
between the relevant stakeholders are per se fundamental procedural means to achieve 
self-determination,76 since self-determination in the post-colonial era is particularly 
relevant as a procedural principle.77
It is clear and indisputable that ISIS is not claiming statehood through peaceful 
means, nor is it respecting the principles of self-determination and uti possidetis, nor is 
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ISIS negotiating its statehood with Iraq and Syria.78 Although no State has openly 
supported ISIS insurgency by military means, the whole Middle East is a battlefield, 
and, since ISIS is not a self-determination unit, the situation in Iraq and Syria should be 
qualified as an armed conflict between ISIS and the governments of the two States, with 
the intervention of some third States. 
Moreover, there is room to argue that the Islamic State is an entity created in 
violation of the procedural aspect of the principle of self-determination since the true 
will and aspirations of the local population have not been taken into account.79 E.g., no 
referendum or election have been held in order to ask the local population whether they 
would like to be part of the future Islamic State. Indeed, the population seems terrified 
by ISIS, which is far more popular among fundamentalists around the world (the so-
called foreign fighters) than among the inhabitants of Syria and Iraq,80 as demonstrated 
by the enormous flux of refugees from Syria and Iraq. By not respecting the procedural 
norms relating to the will of the local people,81 ISIS reinforces the idea that it is 
pursuing statehood in an illegal way.
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Second, it has been suggested that respect for human rights is a condition of 
statehood. It is generally agreed that State sovereignty today implies the duty to protect 
and secure the human rights of the population,82 and, for this reason, some scholars 
consider that a State must be able and willing to secure fundamental human rights in 
order to have international personality.83 However, this opinion is not supported by 
State practice and the respect for fundamental human rights is not a statehood criterion 
today.84 Rather, the systematic violations and widespread atrocities committed by ISIS 
contribute to the idea that ISIS is not a State; in fact, other States consider it a 
perversion that ISIS calls itself a State while simultaneously violating the fundamental 
rights of local inhabitants.85
Lastly, the centrality of the principle of self-determination and of human rights law 
in the current statehood discourse has led some commentators to consider the existence 
of a democratic government as a cornerstone of modern statehood.86 This fascinating 
idea simply does not accord with the present structure of the international legal order, 
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but rather reflects a new trend, politically supported by mainly the Western Countries.87 
De lege lata, the capacity to effectively govern a territory is sufficient for the emergence 
of a new State even if the government is not democratic.88 However, one should note 
that ISIS government is not democratic, and the future possible State would not be a 
democratic State but, rather, a caliphate; such a theological and dictatorial form of 
government could present a danger for the international community, but it is not per se 
sufficient to prevent ISIS from gaining international personality.
In conclusion, the failure of ISIS to fulfill the additional legal statehood criteria that 
have been formulated by scholars in recent decades reinforces the idea that ISIS is not a 
State.
3. The International Community Before ISIS’s Claim to Be a State
After having concluded that ISIS is not a State according to the factual and legalist 
theories, but that it is merely a group of insurgents, it is now time to consider the 
attitude that other States have towards ISIS. Even if the constitutive theory has been 
rejected in principle above, it is commonly believed today that an unanimous 
recognition by other States, the admission of an entity to international organizations and 
its participation in many bilateral or multilateral treaties play a role in the statehood 
87
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discourse. The Montevideo Convention uses the formula ‘capacity to enter in relations 
with the other States’ and considers it a fundamental criterion. More correctly, though, 
this capacity should be considered as a mere consequence of the independence and 
effectiveness of a government, and not a statehood precondition.89 
However, since States are the main actors in the international legal order and 
choose freely whether to recognize another entity as a State, whether to admit it into an 
international organization, and whether to conclude accords with it, all these phenomena 
are considered relevant as manifestations of the International Community’s attitude 
about the existence of an entity as a State. According to factual scholars, the 
international ‘sociality’ of an entity is a demonstration of its fulfillment of the statehood 
criteria, and, at the same time, an exercise of effective and independent powers in the 
sphere of the international relations.90 According to legalistic views, a wide recognition 
and membership in several international organizations can contribute to the creation of 
the international personality of an entity by partially supplying to the lack of factual 
elements;91 some authors even suggest that UN membership is clear and sufficient 
evidence of an entity’s statehood.92
It is also undisputed that collective non-recognition and non-participation in 
international agreements can affect statehood to a certain extent. On the one hand, 
supporters of the factual theory consider that the total lack of international relations 
undermines the effectiveness and independence of the entity, which cannot therefore be 
89
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considered a State.93 On the other, in a legalistic view, collective non-recognition is the 
sanction faced by the entity that has violated those fundamental rules of international 
law considered to be legal statehood criteria.94 
ISIS is totally isolated in the international arena because no State has recognized its 
statehood, and the UN has not endorsed its claim.95 There is no international agreement 
between ISIS and other international actors, let alone States. Finally, ISIS is not a 
member of any international organizations. It is clear and indisputable that the entire 
International Community rejects the idea that ISIS has ever been a State. 
Since all the UN official documents and records consider ISIS to be an armed 
group or an ensemble of armed groups,96 it is reasonable to conclude that the 
International Community considers ISIS to be a group of insurgents. It clear that the 
International Community’s attitude towards ISIS makes it very difficult the possibility 
for ISIS of entering in relations with other States.97
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The difference between the Islamic State and an actual state should be
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 as obvious as the difference between John Kerry and a helicopter.98
It is impossible to foretell future developments in an area as complex as the Middle 
East, but for the time being, ISIS is not a State because it lacks the factual and legal 
elements required by international law. However, qualifying ISIS as insurgents should 
be considered a warning since insurgency is inherently a temporary status; after some 
time, insurgents either become States or are defeated. Defeating ISIS and creating an 
inclusive environment where such aberrations cannot find fertile soil are the main 
challenges faced by the International Community today.99 Even if this goal seems to be 
about to be achieved, the International Community must learn from past errors in the 
area.
The quite surprising fact is that ISIS has never looked for international recognition, 
membership in international organizations or agreements with existing States. ISIS 
propaganda is about radically changing the world, and, accordingly, there is no desire to 
become part to the ordre établi. For this reason, even if it necessary to analyze ISIS 
statehood according to a conceptual framework of international law, one should pay due 
attention to the fact that the ultimate goal ISIS boasts is the radical change of the world 
community and the creation of a centralized and potentially universal Islamic State. 
Fortunately, this is far from a realistic scenario as confirmed by the historic failure of 
every dream of universal conquer and the success of the fight against ISIS in Syria and 
Iraq. However, ISIS ultimate goal must be acknowledged and rationalized in order to 
avoid illegal and unjust responses dictated by simple fear.100
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